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MYRES McDOUGAL

-

AN APPRECIATION

OSCAR SCHACHTER*

What a happy thought - though not at all surprising
for a new student journal of international law to dedicate its
inaugural issue to Professor Myres McDougal. As one who has
benefited immensely from an intellectual and personal association of long standing with Professor McDougal, I am delighted
to find new evidence of the esteem in which he is held and,
especially, of the influence of his ideas on students interested
in international law.
These ideas are not easy to sum up in a few words - they
are, as befits the subjects, complex, subtle and wide-ranging.
They incorporate concepts and insights from many disciplines
and they demand close and serious study. But one need not
master the complexities to appreciate the grand scale of McDougal's and Lasswell's intellectual conception of international
law as a powerful and realistic instrument for human betterment and to realize why it has stimulated so many international lawyers, of varying background and outlook, to break
new ground in their approach to the concrete subjects of the
profession.
It has been remarked by Kierkegaard that builders of great
systems are like men who erect a great castle and live in a
small hut next door. But one cannot think of McDougal as
living in a small hut. On the contrary, he has occupied the
great castle, rallying to his cause those who share his profound
moral concerns and his belief in rational disciplined inquiry.
He has invited intellectual battle by vigorously assaulting rival
theories and by puncturing the platitudes and undermining the
assumptions of established doctrine. His scorn has been meted
out equally to the learned technicians who lose sight of important goals and to the idealists who remain on the level of
generality and pious hopes.
Appealing as this may seem, it cannot be said that his
cause has swept all before it. There are more than a few both in and outside the profession - who regard his central
conception of a "policy oriented" international law as profoundly
mistaken, indeed as 'vain' and 'arrogant'. In their view, neither
the qualifications of the lawyer nor the structure of international society warrant placing the jurist in a significant and
explicit political role. They fear that by stepping outside of a
rule-oriented approach and the sanctioned sources of interna*Deputy Director United Nations Institute for Training and Research.
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tional law, the way is opened for arbitrary or partisan decisions
which express the preferences of the decision-maker rather
than the policy of the revelant community.
What is most persuasive in McDougal's response to the
criticism is his impressive unmasking of the pretensions of traditional rule-oriented analysis as objective and value-free. His
voluminous works demonstrate with characteristic vigor and
abundant examples the extent to which the jurist in one capacity or another, faces inescapable choices involving alternative
'policy' preferences. To purport to resolve such issues on the
basis of semantic analysis or historical precedent is a snare and
a delusion. It obscures and often confuses the questions of
central concern and it permits arbitrary or subjective preferences to be presented as mandatory objective conclusions. That
this may serve, in some measure, professional interests or sustain authority is acknowledged by McDougal but he regards
such pseudo-objectivity as transparently misleading and, more
important, as obfuscating the process of rational inquiry that
should be the essential feature of international decision-making.
The more difficult and challenging task faced by McDougal
is to demonstrate in a positive way that the jurist can resolve
conflicts of interest and ideology on the basis of manifest
"policy" of the community grounded in the expectations and
common interests of all of the relevant participants. McDougal
is of course aware of the complexity of this task. He knows, as
Lasswell has put it, that one cannot assume that universalized
rhetoric means universalized conduct or expectations. To determine international policy in the face of conflicting demands
and ideologies, one needs to look beyond and beneath the generalities of international rhetoric and the self-serving declarations of national states. Easy formulas are not available but
McDougal and Lasswell have done much to show that the process of ascertaining common interests and policy can be pursued
realistically through systematic examination of goals, conditions,
strategies and consequences. Their massive studies on the oceans,
outer space, the use of force, and others show how this might
be done. Whether or not one is persuaded by their conclusions
in particular cases, the significant aspect is the method of disciplined inquiry and explicit rationality for reaching conclusions.
As one who has in his professional life as an international
official been especially sensitive to the dangers of partisan positions being presented as legally objective conclusions, I can
warmly applaud the effort to eliminate a covert subjectivism
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and to develop a disciplined approach to ascertaining as objectively as possible the priorities and policies of the community
of states. The fact that this may not always be possible to do
is not a sufficient reason to abandon the effort and resort to
hocus-pocus of verbal incantation.
One of the liberating and exhilarating features of the McDougal-Lasswell approach has been the systematic way in
which it has related law, social phenomena and basic values.
It has moved international law away (on the one side) from
verbal dialectic, and (on the other) from the 'ad hoc' case by
case approach which passes for pragmatism. It is an approach
which requires relating events to their causes and consequences, the particular case to the general goal, the part to the
whole, the rule to its function, the whole process to the basic
purposes and values of mankind. This is in sharp contrast to
the thinness of legal positivism with its essentially 'status quo'
orientation. The McDougal approach enables one to see international legal processes among the major instruments of change,
even of fundamental change, and to employ law purposively
and rationally to eliminate the constricting effects of a narrow
parochialism in the interests of a more just and decent world
order.
This, stated far too briefly and crudely, is what I find in
the contribution of Myres McDougal and it suggests why I
regard him as a towering and inspirational figure in international law. The editors of The Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy have every reason to congratulate themselves
on their selection.

